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ABSTRACT
Russian-Chinese interaction in the Far East covers relations between 
the two largest world civilizations: Russia and China. One of its most 
important features is Chinese migration in the Russian Far Eastern 
(RFE) border region. This article analyzes the role and importance 
of Chinese migration as an integral component of the Sino-Russian 
cross-border interactions that has had varied effects over the past 
century and a half. Chinese migration is an indispensable condition for 
the emergence and development of cross-border practices in the RFE 
and the presence and economic activity of Chinese migrants ensures 
the continued development of forms of cross-border interaction 
and, in general, the dialogue between the cultures. To substantiate 
this thesis, systemic and historical-chronological methods are used 
to analyze a significant amount of factual and statistical material 
accumulated by historical research in the works of Russian and 
Chinese historians and social researchers.
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Introduction
Sino-Russian relations have an over four-century history. Today, contacts between 
Russia and China have become not only a part of global international relations, but 
also an essential component of an inter-civilizational convergence (Myasnikov, 2017, 
p. 11). This makes new research on the history of this relationship – particularly in the 
Russian Far East (RFE) – increasingly important.
Russian-Chinese interaction in the Far East began to develop in the second half 
of the 19th century. After the signing of the Aigun1 and Beijing Treaties2, there was a 
wave of Russian migration from Europe to the southern territories of the Russian Far 
East. Through the development of agricultural, industry, and transport in this border 
territory, the two civilizations began to converge. It was here that Russian-Chinese 
interaction was the greatest. At the same time, Chinese migrants in the Russian Far 
East formed one a distinct, but related subgroup.
This Chinese migration flow, which began in the 19th century, has today become an 
integral part of the RFE’s socio-economic life. And today more than ever, the economic 
activity and the peculiarities of the interactions of this Chinese migrant population 
with the Russian population continues to have a direct impact on the development 
of Russian-Chinese cooperation at all levels. Consequently, the study of Chinese 
migration continues to be important for the Russian state.
Over the past 150 years, Chinese migration to the RFE has been the most 
important element in determining Sino-Russian relations. Several cross-border 
practices in the RFE are important to consider here. Nevertheless, ethnic and 
migration studies remain “a rag-tag field”, defined by one scholar as “a ragged field of 
study, not an intellectually unified discipline” (DeTona et al., 2019, p. 7). Scholars have 
mainly studied the socio-economic aspects of the Chinese migration to the RFE, as 
well as the peculiarities of the Chinese migrants’ legal status. Yet the daily interactions 
of the Russian population and Chinese migrants, including cross-border practices and 
dialogue has not yet sufficiently been analyzed.
The purpose of the current article is to analyze the role of Chinese migration 
in the RFE border area as an integral part of cross-border Sino-Russian practices. 
Throughout the long history of Sino-Russian relations in the RFE, a cultural dialogue 
between these two unique cultures has unfolded. While this dialogue is not an explicit 
part of the common understanding of either culture, it has been recognized to have 
important effects (Ornatskaya, 2014, pp. 51–52). The current article explores this 
dialogue through everyday actions and interactions, i.e., situated discursive practices 
(Linell, 2004, pp. 7–9).
1 The Aigun Treaty, which was concluded on May 16 (28), 1858, established the Russian-Chinese 
border, and legally assigned to Russia the areas in the Amur region. The Russians claimed the territory on 
the left bank of the Amur river to the sea, while the Chinese claimed the right bank. The exclusive rights of 
Russian and Chinese vessels to sail on the Amur, Sungari, and Ussuri rivers was also established.
2 The Beijing Treaty, which was concluded on November 2 (14), 1860, finally secured for Russia 
the Ussuri territory. The western border between the two countries was also fixed with this treaty. Moreover, 
Russia received the right to duty-free trade along the entire eastern border.
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This dialogue is most obvious in the RFE border, where, due to the geographical 
proximity of Russian and China, maximum rapprochement occurs. The ongoing 
contact of these two cultures is highly interdependent in this region and could be 
interrupted only by force. At the same time, the RFE – traditionally conceived of 
in Russia as a region far from the central Russia, and thus already alienated from 
Russian culture in general – is a peripheral area, remote from the cultural and 
economic centers of both countries. Cross-border practices thus flourish here are 
considered to be forms of interaction that exceed each state individually.
This article argues that Chinese migration is an indispensable condition for the 
emergence and development of the cross-border practices in the RFE. The presence 
and economic activities of Chinese migrants not only ensure the development of 
diverse forms of cross-border interaction; they are also integral in fostering of cultural 
dialogue and cultural diffusion.
A system method was used in this study. This allows me to analyze Chinese 
migration as a subject of the formation of social cross-border practices of Russian-
Chinese interaction in the RFE territories across cultural, historical and geopolitical 
contexts, and, at the same time, as a coherent system with its own development and 
homeostasis. Furthermore, a historical-chronological method allows me to consider 
Sino-Russian relations through the prism of the Chinese migration’s effect on the 
development and transformation of the RFE.
Historical Stages of the Intercultural Dialogue between Russia and China  
in the Russian Far East 
Stage One–“Creation”: the middle of the 19th century through the beginning of the 
20th centuries. Completely new patterns were formed in this period of the Russian 
Empire’s development of the RFE in the wake of the Aigun and Beijing treaties. These 
new patterns crystallized in the emerging contact zone of the RFE border. It was 
here that Chinese migration flows increased the most. William Petersen has called 
this migration an “impelled migration” (Petersen, 1958, p. 262): in the middle of the 
19th century, the invasion of China by imperialist powers and its transformation into a 
semi-colonial country led to the emergence of a layer of Chinese coolies who went to 
work outside their homeland and made up a significant part of Chinese migration. By 
1897, there were 43,000 Chinese citizens in the RFE (Wishnick, 2002, p. 42).
During this time, Chinese migrants began to engage actively in the economic 
life of the region where there was previously a shortage of labor. The settlement of 
the region by ethnic Russians from the west, however, was slow. From 1861–1891 
about 43,000 immigrants arrived in the Amur and Primorye regions. The Russians had 
followed a military-strategic orientation to the settlement of the RFE which resulted 
in a mixed population of Cossacks, peasants, and prospectors, but very few workers 
(Krushanov, 1991, pp. 32–34). This set the stage for an influx of Chinese workers 
because of the exceptional proximity of the region to China. According to official 
data, the number of Chinese prospectors in the mines of the mountainous districts 
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of Amur, Primorye, and Transbaikalia in 1910 reached 25,000 people (Ossendovsky, 
1916, p. 20). Chinese labor was widely used in the construction of railways. So, in 
1892–1916, 200,000 Chinese people worked on the construction of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway (Li, 2006, p. 121).
Because of socio-economic and geopolitical factors, Chinese migration to the 
RFE became a hotspot for Russian-Chinese interaction, foreign trade, and Chinese 
small to medium business. In 1910, in the Primorsky and Amur regions, there were 
4,267 Chinese trading enterprises with a total exchange of more than 25 million rubles 
(Gravje, 1912, p. 362), or 185 million US dollars. Chinese migration also led to the 
emergence of a host of illegal and semi-illegal activities that have long been rooted 
in the RFE: smuggling, Honghuzies3, opiate smoking, horse stealing, poaching, 
and espionage. Furthermore, the Chinese population at this time started to stratify 
itself into specific trades and professions from merchants, workers, and artisans to 
tradesmen and smugglers.
This influx of Chinese migrants also led to significant cultural exchange. Russian 
settlers became more acquainted with the Chinese traditions. There is evidence that 
the Russian urban population decorated their houses in Chinese-style dwellings 
(Petrov, 2003, pp. 754–755) and great interest in Vladivostok grew because of the 
Chinese celebration of the Chinese New Year in that city. Moreover, since the end of 
the 19th century, Chinese theaters have been an important part of settlements in the 
RFE. In Vladivostok, for example, there were three Chinese theaters by the end of 
the 19th century, and in Khabarovsk, there were two theaters. In return, the Chinese 
people showed interest in the Russian language and culture. They visited Russian 
libraries, theaters, museums, and concerts, and attended Russian language courses 
or hired tutors. Among the 1,987 people who visited the museum of the Troitskosavsko-
Kyakhtinsky branch of the Amur Department of the Imperial Russian Geographical 
Society in 1904, 520 were Chinese (26.2% of the total number of visitors). Chinese 
children also had the opportunity to learn Russian in the “Vladivostok Nikolayevsk 
City Russian-Chinese School” (opened in 1897 in Vladivostok), which the Chinese 
City Society Organization helped create. At the school, Chinese children studied 
alongside Russians. In 1899, there were 75 Russian children at the school, 15 Chinese 
children, and 5 children of Russian Koreans. The school also taught Russian children 
Chinese (Petrov, 2003, pp. 702–705, 729, 755). The development of Russian-Chinese 
intercultural interaction was facilitated by the opening in 1899 of the Eastern Institute 
in Vladivostok, where the teaching of Sinology disciplines was pioneered in Russia. 
Among the faculty of the Institute were several Chinese professors. The activities 
of the Institute made a great contribution to the development of scientific contacts 
between Russia and China, and surely contributed to the cultural interpenetration of 
the two peoples and the formation of their inter-civilization relations.
It must be emphasized that during this historical stage the RFE region was seen 
as part of periphery by both cultures. This peripherality had a direct impact on the 
3 The participants of armed groups, which had operated in Manchuria since the middle of the 
19th century until 1949, were called Honghuzies (from the Chinese “Honghuzi” – “red-bearded”). They were 
mostly either bankrupt migrants, or the Chinese fleeing to Manchuria from hard labor.
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development of cross-border contacts. The RFE regional authorities were entrusted 
with migration control and regulation of migrants’ activities; however, as there was 
no developed migration legislation, serious difficulties and problems arose. This 
situation was aggravated by the impossibility of accurately registering Chinese 
migrants (because of shortcomings in statistical work); the isolation of the Chinese 
community; and, at the same time, the mobility of the Chinese; illegal Chinese 
penetration into Russian territory; and the cultural specifics of Chinese names and 
surnames. Local regional authorities were thus largely left alone to make decisions 
about Chinese migrants.
The Committee on the Settlement of the Far East, established in 1909, developed 
measures to limit the influx of Chinese migrants. The fee for a passing certificate or 
visa was increased and the use of Chinese labor in military and railway construction 
was prohibited. These measures, as well as “The Law about Some Restrictions on 
Foreigners” (established on June 21, 1910), which prohibited the hiring of foreign 
nationals with treasury funds, only slightly reduced the number of Chinese workers 
in the RFE. In 1910 before these measures there were 42,500 Chinese workers in 
the RFE according to official figures (70% of the total number of Russian workers), 
while in 1911 there were 36,200 workers (about 50%). However, less than a month 
after the adoption of this law, significant concessions were made. For example, 
§4 of the law gave the Council of Ministers the right to allow foreigners to perform 
urgent work (in case of a shortage of Russian workers). This made it possible for 
many departments to obtain permits to hire Chinese workers for construction and 
other works (Romanova, 2000, p. 87). Importantly, these restrictive measures were 
applied before the outbreak of World War I. On July 25, 1914, the tsarist government 
temporarily allowed Chinese people to work at enterprises. Subsequently, the 
number of Chinese workers increased once again. By October 1917, there were 
about 500,000 Chinese people in Russia, including more than 200,000 in the RFE 
(Li, 1996, p. 6; Yin, 1997, p. 32).
In general, this first historical stage saw a fairly stable development of cross-
border practices. The field of interaction between Chinese and Russian populations 
expanded, and more forms of cultural contact became routine. Due to civilizational 
differences, the Chinese migrants did not seek to assimilate into Russian society, but 
they did actively contribute to the socio-economic processes of the RFE.
Stage Two – “Conversion”: 1918–1938. The second stage was not long, but it 
was exceptionally. After October 1917, a new stage in Sino-Russian relations began. 
The new Chinese migrants to Soviet territory were now considered to be useful as 
participants in the upcoming class battles – particularly as the Soviet leadership 
oriented itself toward the implementation of a world socialist revolution.
Chinese migrants on Russian territory thus became an important element of the 
Soviet national policy system. The policy regarding Chinese migrants was developed 
in accordance with the programmatic guidelines of the ruling Communist Party. One 
goal was to use “revolutionary” Chinese migrants in the implementation of socialist 
revolutions across Asia. To achieve this aim, varieties of methods were used. First, 
an international consciousness for the Chinese workers was needed. Protecting the 
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rights of Chinese migrants on Soviet territory was seen as integral to the process 
of introducing Chinese migrants to the revolutionary transformations in Russia and 
further internationalist education.
In April 1917, the Union of Chinese Citizens in Russia was created in Petrograd. In 
December 1918, it was renamed the Union of Chinese Workers. By the middle of 1920, 
the Union included more than 50,000 people and had branches in Samara, Saratov, 
Kiev, Murmansk, Vyatka, Chelyabinsk, Tashkent, Yekaterinburg, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, 
Irkutsk, Blagoveshchensk, Chita, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and other Soviet cities 
(Lin, 1994, pp. 101–102). Under the leadership of the Union, schools for political literacy 
were created; lectures were given; and communist cells were organized.
On June 25, 1920, the Central Organizing Bureau (CSC) of the Chinese 
Communists in Russia was created, which carried out propaganda work among the 
Chinese workers living in Russia. About 1,600 Chinese attended a course at the 
University of Chinese Workers, while at the Communist University of the East Workers 
there were about 500 participants. Chinese revolutionaries also had opportunities 
to get involved with the Frunze Military Academy, the Tolmachev Military-Political 
Academy, the Higher Artillery School, the Flight Military Theoretical School, the 
International Leninist School, and the Central Komsomol School (Pantsov, 2001, 
pp. 230–231, 237).
In 1918–1922, the cardinal socio-economic and political transformations took 
place in the RFE. Regions and governments changed kaleidoscopically during the 
civil war. In this difficult situation, however, the flows of Chinese migrants and their 
economic activities in the RFE border region continued. Because of a shortage 
of Russian workers, there was need for Chinese labor. During the civil war and 
intervention, the RFE’s ties with the central industrial regions were severed, so the 
Russian population needed Chinese food and industrial goods more than usual. The 
successive authorities had their own approaches to regulating Soviet relations with 
the Chinese people. In the Amur Labor Socialist Republic, Chinese migrants were 
given equal rights as Russians. During the years of the Far Eastern Republic (FER), 
the Chinese, who were regarded as a national minority there, were granted the right 
to create cultural-national autonomy. Enshrined in Art. 121 of the FER Constitution, 
this right proclaimed: “All the national minorities in the territory of the Republic shall 
be granted autonomy in matters pertaining to their national culture.” (Constitution 
of the Far Eastern Republic, 1921, p. 54). According to the Constitution of the FER, 
two conditions were important for the development of cultural-national autonomy: (a) 
that Chinese migrants be guaranteed all the rights as any other citizens of the FER, 
and (b) that they were also given the opportunity to preserve their distinctive and 
traditional characteristics. During the FER period, guidelines were also set for future 
regulation of Russian-Chinese interaction. Chinese migrants were tacitly divided 
into “working people” – who needed to be internationalized and revolutionized – 
and “entrepreneurs” – or those that were not considered as the future revolutionary 
vanguard in the East and who were allowed to continue their economic activities in 
the RFE because of the socio-economic situation of the region and because of the 
historical practices of interaction between the population of two countries.
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In 1918–1922, cross-border practices were supplemented by an additional 
component: Chinese migrants, who participated in the civil war in Russia and, 
who upon returning to their homeland, passed on revolutionary experience and 
revolutionary ideas. The Chinese people fought in the Red Guard units of the 
Grodekovsky, Ussuriysky, Daursky, and other fronts, as well as participated in the 
liberation of Primorye. The names of the leaders of the Chinese armed groups (e.g., 
Chen Bochuan, Sun Jiwu, Wang Yingzu, San Hu, Yang Dehai, Li Po, A. Songfu, 
Sheng Chenghuo, and others) are still famous across Russia. In total, there were 
30,000–40,000 Chinese people in the Red Army during the civil war (Kheifets, 1959, 
p. 79; Li, 1979, p. 42; Li, 1987, p. 230).
After the civil war and intervention, large-scale work to implement the principles 
of Soviet national policy in the RFE was begun. Chinese migrants were granted the 
rights of a national minority in the Soviet state. Chinese newspapers were organized; 
the Latin alphabet was spread among Chinese workers; and clubs were opened (in 
the late 1920s, in the RFE there were six clubs for Eastern Asian workers, with a 
total of 1,945 mainly Chinese members) (State Archive of the Khabarovsk Region, 
fond P-2, inv.11, file 193, p. 17). Party education courses were also organized and 
libraries for Chinese workers were created. The organization of Chinese theaters 
in the Soviet Far East became an integral part of the general process of the RFE’s 
cultural development. The most fruitful Chinese theater scene was in Vladivostok, 
where on March 19, 1931, the unique Chinese Working Youth Theater was created.
Chinese workers were involved in the trade union, cooperative, and Stakhanovite 
movement. In 1931, of the 50,000 Chinese workers in the region, 6,300 were registered 
as members of trade unions (12.6%), as well as nearly 3,000 Chinese migrants were 
employed in the handicraft industry (State Archive of the Khabarovsk Region, fond 
P-2, inv.9, file 73, p. 191; State Archive of the Primoriye, fond P-67, inv.1, file 82, p. 108).
In the 1930s, the Chinese collective farms became a regular phenomenon. 
In 1932, there were 13 Chinese collective farms in the region, in which about 
3,000 Chinese migrants worked together (Zalesskaia, 2009, pp. 272–273).
Furthermore, more schools were opened for Chinese children (by 1928, there 
were four first-level Chinese schools in the Soviet Far East) and labor schools were 
opened for adults. By January 1, 1932, 809 Chinese migrants and 3,828 children of 
Chinese migrants were studying in the official educational institutions of the region 
(State Archive of the Khabarovsk Region, fond P-2, inv.9, file 73, p. 126). Additionally, 
the unique Far Eastern Regional Higher Chinese Leninist School was founded on 
March 1, 1933, which offered educational opportunities specially created for Chinese 
workers who were previously unable to obtain secondary and higher education. This 
emphasis on education enriched the structure of the study system and contributed to 
its success. Many of these Chinese people educated on Soviet territory subsequently 
became active participants in the revolutionary movements in China (Zalesskaia, 
2009, pp. 311–312).
This progressive work stopped in the middle of 1930s, however, when the 
international situation forced Soviet leadership to choose the security of the region 
over social development. During this time, Chinese migrants were severely victimized, 
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and in 1938 they were even expelled from the Soviet Far East. For almost half a century, 
the RFE borders were closed.
This period marks the beginning of Stage Three – “Lockdown”: 1938–1988. 
During this period all the cross-border practices were significantly interrupted. In fact, 
during this stage there were virtually no contacts at the intercultural level.
Russian-Chinese border interactions resumed again with the opening of borders 
in the late 1980s. This marks the beginning of Stage Four – “Regeneration”: 
from the end of the 1980s (1988) to present. The first tourist exchange occurred in 
September 1988, when the USSR and the PRC exchanged the first tourist groups. 
Two groups of people – numbering 40 each – made a day-long trip on visa-free 
exchange from Blagoveshchensk (in the center of the Amur region) and Heihe (on 
the USSR-Chinese border).
Subsequently, the migration flow across the Russian-Chinese border began to 
re-emerge and Chinese migrants started developing entrepreneurial activity again 
in the RFE. Chinese migrants assessed the potential and prospects of the RFE 
market, established channels for the transportation of goods for trade in Russia, and 
developed various forms of business organizations. At the same time, the Chinese 
migrant population constantly communicated with the Russian population. At the end 
of the 20th century, new cross-border practices started to unfold on border territories 
including “shuttle” (or “people’s”) barter trade, joint Russian-Chinese enterprises 
with foreign (Chinese) investments, cross-border tourism, cultural relations, and – as 
before – smuggling, “gray” customs, illegal cross-border currency transactions, etc.
While cross-border contacts re-emerged with active barter trade, over several 
years larger-scale business activities also developed in the RFE. For example, 
Chinese shopping centers increased in Russian cities, and there was a lively trade in 
a wide variety of goods. The Russian financial crisis of 1998 significantly displaced 
many Russian entrepreneurs, but this only opened up more space for Chinese 
entrepreneurs. The same situation repeated after the Russian financial crises of 
2008 and 2014. During these times, Chinese migrants developed their businesses 
drawing extensively on ethnic resources and ethnic networks. Among Chinese 
migrants, marriage with Russian women was also a common way to obtain full rights 
in Russia. When married to a Russian woman, a Chinese migrant was able arrange 
his business in the name of his wife, and thus pay much less rent and other taxes, as 
well as receive legal protection for their business on Russian territory (Zalesskaia, 
2019, pp. 37–38).
Today, Russia implements a special state policy in the RFE through the Territories 
of Advanced Development and the Free Port of Vladivostok. The aim of this policy is to 
increase the profitability and reduce the risks of foreign investors. Eighteen Territories 
of Advanced Development with special tax and customs status have already been 
created. Russia’s implementation of major new investment projects in the RFE, as 
well as China’s promotion of the “One Belt and One Road” Initiative, the Heilongjiang 
development of the “Three Bridges – One Island” plan all suggest rapidly increasing 
cross-border interaction. All this creates more opportunities for the formation and 
development of new cross-border practices, such as cross-border e-commerce, 
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the development of financial infrastructure, the use of national currencies in mutual 
settlements, etc.
In fact, the share of Chinese foreign direct investment in the Pacific Russia is 
still less than 1%, of which two-thirds is directed to the Trans-Baikal region for the 
construction of the only major Chinese plant in the Pacific Russia: the Amazar 
Pulp and Saw Mill (APSM). This means there is still much room for development. 
Furthermore, the share of Chinese investments in APSM and Free Port of Vladivostok 
is only 16.3 billion rubles ($259 million) and 1.67 billion rubles ($25.7 million). In total, 
Chinese businesses have invested less than $300 million across 45 projects. Primarily, 
this Chinese business is attracted to the extraction and primary processing of raw 
materials rather than the development of industry (Larin, 2020, p. 21).
Despite the proclamation of favorable business regimes, Chinese investors 
remain frightened by systematic problems: a small local market, the limited economic 
power of the region, the small population, and the lack of transport infrastructure. 
According to Chinese experts, the underdeveloped Russian border transport 
infrastructure has always been the main factor limiting the development of Sino-
Russian trade and economic cooperation. Many of the border port infrastructures 
are also dilapidated, and the capacity of the border ports is not commensurate with 
the cargo flow and the volume of cargo transportation, which leads to a large delay 
in cargo (Guo et al., 2017, p. 76). Moreover, the Russian legal system seems to be 
too complicated for Chinese migrants. Sophisticated Russian tax and customs laws 
often negate the benefits that the Territories of Advanced Development and the Free 
Port of Vladivostok regimes offer to potential investors.
At the same time, regional leaders acknowledge that without the cross-border 
practices of Chinese migrants, the economy of the RFE would lose significant 
infusions and income, and the Russian population would lose the opportunity to 
purchase cheap everyday goods and a whole range of products. One attempt to 
close the borders resulted in immediate protests. In the summer of 2003, when fatal 
SARS4 cases were first registered in China, 11 customs points were closed on the 
Amur River by order of the federal government, and the import of Chinese goods 
was limited. Less than a week later, a picket was organized in front of the Amur 
government building, the participants demanded that customs be opened, as almost 
all consumer goods were experiencing a shortage and the prices in the city markets 
has increased significantly. At that time, the borders reopened very quickly.
Today the situation is much more serious. On January 30, 2020, Russian Prime 
Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to close the Russian border in the RFE to 
prevent the spread of a new type of coronavirus (COVID-19). Beginning March 18, 
Russia further restricted the entry of foreigners and stateless persons.
Such unprecedented measures were not taken during the spread of SARS and 
bird flu, which still had generally negatively effects on the development of cross-
border trade and economic relations. Many Russian firms and private entrepreneurs 
have suffered losses, especially on imported goods for their business from China. 
Since these measures have been put in place, RFE economic actors have been 
4 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).
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forced to reorient themselves to Russian factories that offer goods at prices at least 
twice as expensive, and with high delivery costs. Moreover, the closure of freight 
transport links with China has also led to a shortage of Chinese vegetables. Freight 
traffic has been opened and this may solve the problem of vegetable shortages 
(Ob”em importa kitayskih ovoshchey, 2020). However, other goods have not yet 
been allowed to cross the border (the only exception are parts for a Gas Processing 
Plant being constructed in the Amur Region). The education industry has also 
experienced negative consequences because of the closure of the border. Chinese 
students who had returned home for Chinese New Year were not able to return to 
RFE universities. With the border now closed on orders from Moscow, this has all 
ground to a halt, leaving the city frozen in limbo. Businesses that depend on China are 
shriveling, hotels once full of Chinese guests stand empty and the local university, 
once a magnet for paying pupils from China, is struggling to cope as hundreds of its 
students who went home for the Lunar New Year holiday find themselves stranded. 
Ms. Li Lihua, a Russian-speaking Chinese businesswoman, who has been working 
in Blagoveshchensk since the 1990s, said this is the worst economic situation she 
has encountered (see: Higgins, 2020).
In short, the COVID pandemic has halted a significant part of cross-border 
practices between the territories of Russia and China, and will undoubtedly have 
negative consequences for the development of relations between the two countries 
in the future. Unfortunately, China’s success in stopping the COVID epidemic on their 
territory will not be enough to neutralize this decrease in total trade turnover or the 
consequences of months of border closures and the slowdown of interregional and 
intercultural interaction. Losses will continue to be felt even after the official end of 
the pandemic, and it is already obvious that such extraordinary circumstances will 
seriously hinder the development of cross-border practices in the future.
Discussion and Results
This article argued that Chinese migration has played a crucial role in the historical 
process of Sino-Russian relations in the RFE. Chinese migration has functioned 
as an actor in the practice of cross-border contacts and the forming of a special 
relationship between these two civilizations. It analyzed the historical stages of this 
interaction over the last century and a half and the characteristics of these cross-
border practices at each historical stage was discussed. These practices act both 
as a “soft power,” and as a factor in overcoming the periphery status of the RFE 
territories. The article showed that in the absence of Chinese migration flows to the 
RFE border region, cross-border practices cease. And when the flows resume, the 
cross-border practices reappear although they take new form to adapt to the socio-
historical conditions.
The results suggest that the interaction between the two civilizations should be 
considered as a significant factor for cultural, historical and geopolitical devilment of 
the RFE territories, and, at the same time, as a form of interaction across societies and 
cultures. Russian-Chinese interaction has been influenced by many internal factors 
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of the systems of Russian and Chinese societies, as well as Sino-Russian relations 
at the interstate and interregional levels. In this process of forming cross-border 
practices, the penetration of traditions and customs from one culture to another can 
be observed. These processes of cultural diffusion do not lead to the formation of 
a single culture, but to a dialogue between cultures. Thus, the RFE region can be 
characterized as a unique territory for the development of sociocultural practices 
in the process of contacts between Russia and China. Due to Chinese migration 
flows, cross-border practices are an important aspect of the RFE social life and an 
integral part of the interaction process between Russian and Chinese civilizations. 
The continued promotion of successful and mutually beneficial cooperation between 
Russia and China requires yet more study, characterization and analysis, as well 
bilateral work to deepen and optimize cross-border interaction and minimize its 
negative sides.
Conclusion
Chinese migration in the RFE border region is an essential component of Sino-
Russian relations at all levels. During the historical development of these relations, 
Chinese migrants and the Russian populations in the RFE took on many different 
roles over the past century and a half, including trade (and smuggling), guest labor, 
land cultivation, participation in the civil war, the perception of revolutionary ideas, 
etc. The cultural exchange component was an integral part of all these cross-border 
practices: there was familiarity with the traditions and customs of the foreign culture 
in both cases, as well as linguistic exchange. In other words, Sino-Russian relations 
in the RFE have developed through a process of mutual recognition, habituation, and 
coexistence. Without this cultural dialogue, it would have been impossible to develop 
this interactional way of life. Because of transcultural practices, the Russian-Chinese 
border region has accumulated a unique experience of cohabitation and cooperation 
between the peoples of the two countries. The study of this interaction is extremely 
important for understanding migration trends, their regulation, and the formation of a 
tolerant environment for different ethnic groups and their interaction.
Given the unprecedented increase in China’s influence in the world and the 
unique geopolitical proximity of Russia and China in the RFE, Chinese migration 
has the powerful potential of an actor of new cross-border practices. The cross-
border practices that have emerged are poised to become an effective mechanism 
in the development of the RFE territories. However, the question remains, will the 
Russian authorities at various levels be able to implement consistent and effective 
social and economic measures in the RFE? This all depends on the economic 
policy pursued by the Russian government as to whether the presence of Chinese 
migrants and the influx of Chinese investments will contribute to the development 
of the RFE territories, or whether the raw materials orientation and peripherality of 
the RFE region will ultimately overwhelm economic development. If the latter, then 
in the not-too-far future, China may finally lose all interest in the Russian-Chinese 
cross-border practices.
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